For centuries yellow fever was the most dreaded disease in the Americas. Its mysterious origin, rapid course (death in a week), terrifying symptoms (black vomit), and high mortality rate (10 to 75 per cent) created mass panic and paralysed commerce. From 1702 to 1879, North America experienced more than 110 yellow fever epidemics, the most notorious of which decimated Philadelphia (1793), New Orleans (1853), and Memphis (1878). The Tennessee outbreak was part of a larger calamity, which started in New Orleans and spread by riverboats and railways to more than 200 towns throughout the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys. The enormous loss of life (20,000 fatalities) and sheer cost (\$200 million) proved so unnerving to people that a Memphis newspaper dubbed yellow fever "The King of Terrors".

What set yellow fever apart from other diseases was its staggering social impact---most noticeably in the subtropical climate of the US South. Once the disease became rooted in a community, people shunned one another and seemed driven only by the instinct of self-preservation. Those who could afford it, fled to safer locations. As corpses piled up, local governments and businesses came to a standstill, and acres of farmland lay fallow.

Most of the nineteenth-century yellow fever epidemics were traced to Cuba, where the disease was endemic. The 1878 epidemic, for example, originated aboard the Havana steamer *Emily Souder*. Within days of the ship\'s arrival in New Orleans two crewmen, who were ill before disembarking, succumbed to yellow fever. The extensive contacts between Cuba and the United States were seen by American government officials, sanitarians, and newspaper editors as a threat to the health and economy of the southern states. They argued that the perpetually unsanitary conditions in Havana left them no choice but to intervene in Cuban affairs to end the Antillean menace. In reality, southerners themselves shouldered some blame, because they neglected sanitation and relied solely on quarantines to avoid yellow fever even after the mosquito-vector theory was established in 1900.

*Epidemic invasions* is a groundbreaking argument for the central role of yellow fever in US--Cuba relations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Espinosa contends that a hitherto overlooked public health factor underlay the tensions between these two countries. "US sanitation efforts in Cuba ... primarily served the interests of the United States, and Cubans resented this fact" (p. 123). Compelling evidence supports her eye-opening conclusions: first, the principal reason for Congress declaring war on Spain in 1898 was to alleviate unsanitary conditions in Cuba that threatened the US South. Second, the primary concern of the post-war US Army Yellow Fever Board, headed by Major Walter Reed, was to remove the danger yellow fever posed for the southern United States, not to protect occupation forces or help the Cuban people. Even though malaria was known to be a greater threat to US troops and tuberculosis was the major killer of Cubans, American scientists still focused on yellow fever.

Third, the US justified its domination of Cuba by attributing success against yellow fever to Americans alone. The Cuban physician, Carlos Finlay, was never given due credit for originating the concept that the yellow fever pathogen was transmitted to humans by the bite of the female *Culex* (now *Aedes aegypti*) mosquito. Fourth, keeping the island free of yellow fever was essential to maintaining Cuba\'s independence. The US could legally take control of the Cuban government---and did so in September 1906---if the country once again became a haven for yellow fever. American historians, in general, and diplomatic historians have treated the Spanish-American War in terms of expansionism and the influence of yellow journalism, to cite just a few interpretations. The element of disease has been entirely absent. Espinosa, by contrast, has provided an entirely new dimension; namely, the influence of disease on foreign policy. It will be interesting to see if diplomatic scholars, most of whom have completely ignored the role of disease in international relations, are receptive to her novel interpretation.
